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INTRODUCTION
Despite international law's fundamental principle of sovereign
equality, which treats all states equally regardless of their size or
power, international environmental law distinguishes among states
through the principle of "common but differentiated responsibility"
("CDR").' CDR seeks global solutions for global environmental
1. See PATRICIA BIRNIE & ALAN BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 1-2 (2d ed. 2002) (explaining that although international
environmental law is not its own discipline, but rather a subsection of international
law, environmental concerns are considerable enough to warrant a body of law
more specifically aimed at protecting the environment, such as the principle of
CDR); see also Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A
Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 596,
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concerns by considering states' differentiated degrees of
responsibility for causing these problems and their divergent
capacities to redress them.2 Through multilateral environmental
agreements ("MEAs"), international environmental law implements
CDR with more lenient obligations for economically disadvantaged
states.3
The 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer ("Montreal Protocol") is one of the first MEAs to incorporate
CDR into its provisions by administering different obligations for
developed and developing states.4 The Montreal Protocol responds to
615 (1999) (defining the principle of sovereign equality, a basic tenet of traditional
international law, as a transposition of individual liberalism to inter-state relations
where states, like individuals, are free and equal in a state of nature). This principle
justifies international legal rules like "one state, one vote." Id.
2. See Christopher D. Stone, Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in
International Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 276, 276-81 (2004) (describing all elements
of CDR and noting that because richer countries have contributed more to
environmental degradation, they share a greater burden for finding solutions);
Michael Weisslitz, Comment, Rethinking the Equitable Principle of Common but
Differentiated Responsibility: Differential Versus Absolute Norms of Compliance
and Contribution in the Global Climate Change Context, 13 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y 473, 473-78 (2002) (defining CDR in the context of global warming
and finding that CDR places much emphasis on socio-economic realities of the
world).
3. See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea pmbl., Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, 398 (noting that developing countries have "special
interests and needs," and that the Convention is drafted with particular regard to
these special interests and needs).
4. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer art. 5, Sept.
16, 1987, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-10 (1987), 1522 U.N.T.S. 29, 34 [hereinafter
Montreal Protocol] (defining a developing country as a party whose annual level of
consumption of the prohibited controlled substances is less than 0.3 kilograms per
capita and granting these countries the right to delay for ten years compliance with
certain provisions in the Protocol); see also Copenhagen Adjustments and
Amendments to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer, Nov. 25, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 874 (introducing control measures for three new
chemicals, as listed in Annex C, Groups I and 2 and E, Group 1); London
Adjustments and Amendments to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer, art. 10, June 29, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 537, 550-51
[hereinafter London Amendments] (establishing the financial mechanism for
developed countries to provide financial and technical assistance to developing
countries); U.N. Env't Programme [EP], Report of the Eleventh Meeting of the
Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,
annex 5, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro. 11/10 (Dec. 17, 1999) (establishing control
measures for substances in Annex C, Groups I and 3, and imposing restrictions on
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depletion of the ozone layer and regulates the use of ozone-depleting
substances ("ODS") around the world.'
To assist developing countries, the Montreal Protocol grants a ten-
year grace period during which such countries may delay compliance
with the Montreal Protocol's control measures of ODS.6 The
Protocol also stipulates that developed states must help developing
ones comply through technical assistance and a sophisticated funding
mechanism called the Multilateral Fund.7
Many international legal scholars hail the Montreal Protocol as
one of the most effective MEAs to date because it boasts near
universal participation, and scientific studies show that it has
contributed to the recovery of the ozone layer.8 However, despite the
trade with non-parties); U.N. EP, Report of the Ninth Meeting of the Parties to the
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, annex IV, U.N.
Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.9/12 (Sept. 25, 1997) [hereinafter Montreal Amendments]
(requiring licensing systems to control trade in ozone-depleting substances); Stone,
supra note 2, at 279 (citing the Montreal Protocol as one of the first treaties to
incorporate the concept of CDR without using the term in its provisions). For a
compilation of an up-to-date version of the Montreal Protocol as adjusted and
amended, see OZONE SECRETARIAT, U.N. EP, THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL ON
SUBSTANCES THAT DEPLETE THE OZONE LAYER (2000), http://www.unep.org/
ozone/Montreal-Protocol/Montreal-Protocol2000.shtml.
5. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, pmbl., 1522 U.N.T.S. at 29-30
(committing the parties to the ultimate goal of a complete phase-out of ODS); see
also U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Ozone, http://www.epa.gov/
epahome/ozone.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2006) (explaining the science of the
ozone layer, and distinguishing the positive types of ozone from the detrimental
types). In the troposphere, the air closest to the Earth's surface is the "bad"
ozone-it is a pollutant that poses a significant health risk to people with
respiratory diseases and harms plant life. Id. In the stratosphere, the "good" ozone
layer extends upward from about six to thirty miles and protects the Earth from the
sun's harmful ultraviolet ("UV") rays. Id. This second type of ozone is the ozone
with which the Montreal Protocol concerns itself. Id.
6. London Amendments, supra note 4, art. 5, 30 I.L.M. at 547 (obligating
developed countries to freeze their consumption of chlorofluorocarbons ("CFCs"),
the most common type of ODS, ten years before developing countries).
7. Id. art. 10, 30 I.L.M. at 550.
8. See, e.g., K. Madhava Sarma, Compliance with the Montreal Protocol, in
MAKING LAW WORK: ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT 307 (Durwood Zaelke et al. eds., 2005) (reporting that the overall
consumption of the primary ozone-depleting substance, CFCs, has fallen from 1.1
million tons in 1986 to 92,000 tons in 2002, and is still declining); see also Marsha
Walton, Ozone Layer Making a Recovery, CNN, Sept. 2, 2005, http://www.cnn.
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Protocol's successes, some developing states, particularly the weak
ones, are in danger of not fulfilling their obligations under the
Protocol.9 A weak state is one that lacks healthy economic, social,
and political development, and these features lead to internal
instability in all facets of society.'"
Noncompliance issues with the Protocol include the growth of a
black market in regulated ODS, failure to report national ODS use,
and the inability to meet targets and timetables for controlled ODS
following the grace period." Weak states are particularly susceptible
to noncompliance, because they are states where rule of law,
infrastructure, and/or administrative capacity are inadequate. 2
Without full compliance with this agreement by all states, including
com/2005/TECH/science/09/02/ozonerecovery/ (reporting that the rate of the
ozone layer's decline is decreasing steadily, with actual increases in the ozone
layer in some parts of the world); U.N. Dev. Programme, The Montreal Protocol,
Phase Out Targets, http://www.undp.org/montrealprotocol/montreal.htm (last
visited Jan. 14, 2006) [hereinafter Phase Out Targets] (noting that as of September
2002, 183 countries have ratified the Protocol).
9. See, e.g., Elizabeth R. DeSombre, The Experience of the Montreal
Protocol: Particularly Remarkable, and Remarkably Particular, 19 UCLA J.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 49, 51-52 (2000) (fearing that the structure of the Protocol,
with its more lenient provisions for developing states, make the agreement enticing
to these states even though they may not be able to develop the capacity to
comply).
10. See Jim Lobe, Weak States Are "Sleeping Giants" for US Security (June 9,
2004), http://www.antiwar.com/lobe/?articleid=2774 (identifying weak states as
those whose unstable institutions threaten the overall functioning and development
of the country).
11. See ERIC NEUMAYER, MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS,
TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: ISSUES AND POLICY OPTIONS CONCERNING
COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 42 (2001), http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/
geographyAndEnvironment/whosWho/profiles/neumayer/pdf/CUTS.pdf.
12. See generally Robert I. Rotberg, Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak
States: Causes and Indicators, in STATE FAILURE AND STATE WEAKNESS IN A TIME
OF TERROR 3-5 (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2003) (explaining that weak states typically
fail their citizens' expectations of a competent government). However ineffective
as weak states may be, they differ from failing states, which are deeply conflicted
and marked by bitter violence. Id. at 5. North Korea, Belarus, Iraq, and Libya are
examples of weak states, and failed states include Afghanistan, the Congo, and
Sudan. Id. at 5, 10.
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those that are weak, the risk of the ozone not replenishing itself is
great. 13
This Comment argues that the Montreal Protocol's incorporation
of CDR is inadequate because the concepts of "developed" and
"developing" states do not reflect the complicated nature of the
international political system. Part I details how the Montreal
Protocol incorporates CDR into its provisions. Part I then examines
the current progressive compliance theories of international
environmental law underlying the Montreal Protocol. Next, Part I
defines weak states and the reality of the international political
system. Finally, Part I highlights the specific difficulties that the
Protocol faces today regarding weak states.
Part II analyzes the Montreal Protocol's structure and argues that
its encouragement-based approach is insufficient to induce weak
states into compliance. 4 Part II also focuses on how weak states may
exploit Article 5's grace period for developing states to contribute to
the already thriving black market in ODS. Part II then examines how
Article 10's compliance assistance mechanisms, the Multilateral
Fund and technology transfer provision, cannot ensure weak state
compliance with the Protocol. Part II concludes that parties'
interpretation of the existing noncompliance procedure relies too
heavily on the positive incentive approach to stimulate weak states
into action. Lastly, Part III argues that parties can strengthen the
Protocol by understanding weak state behavior, and by combining
both a positive and negative incentive structure to target the
compliance of weak states.
13. See DeSombre, supra note 9, at 51 (noting that the Friends of the Earth, an
environmental organization, admitted that none of its scientific models predicting
the recovery of the ozone layer took into account illegal trade and other
noncompliance).
14. See discussion infra Part II.A (explaining that the modem compliance
theory rests on the rational actor model, but weak states do not always behave
rationally).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. THE PRINCIPLE OF COMMON BUT DIFFERENTIATED
RESPONSIBILITY
CDR seeks to remedy global environmental problems with
participation from all corners of the world. "Common" suggests that
global concerns, like ozone depletion, affect every country. 15
"Responsibility" is "differentiated," or administered in distinct ways
among developed and developing countries to address these
concerns. 6 CDR presumes that developed, industrialized countries
are disproportionately responsible for creating global environmental
problems, and thus they should take the lead in finding solutions. 7
Further, because developing countries are unable to contribute
financially to a global solution, the international community holds
them to a much lesser degree of responsibility. 8 However, CDR
appreciates the importance of including developing countries in the
search for solutions, because as their economies grow and
industrialize, developing countries may cause massive environmental
damage in the future. 9
15. See Stone, supra note 2, at 276 (noting that serious environmental issues,
like ozone depletion and global warming, have no geographic boundaries).
16. See Weisslitz, supra note 2, at 476 (differentiating between states to
determine their degree of responsibility and find the most efficient solutions).
17. See Proceedings of the Ninety-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American
Society of International Law, Common but Differentiated Responsibility, 96 AM.
Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 358, 358 (2002) [hereinafter ASIL Proceedings 2002]
(remarks of Christopher C. Joyner) (applying the concept of CDR to the
international community's effort to deal with greenhouse gas emissions and
climate change). Industrialized countries are responsible for the majority of these
emissions, and thus the 1992 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change
excludes poorer, developing countries from binding emissions reductions
requirements. Id.
18. See Weisslitz, supra note 2, at 476 (noting that it is fair to hold developing
countries less culpable because modem, industrialized economies are largely the
culprit and have the resources to combat it).
19. See Duncan French, Developing States and International Environmental
Law: The Importance of Differentiated Responsibilities, 49 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
35, 50 (2000) (reporting that developing countries have about four-fifths of the
global population and large areas of their land masses not yet industrialized).
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Even though use of the phrase "CDR" is recent, the principle of
differentiated responsibility has evolved over a number of years in
international law.2" The 1972 Stockholm Declaration of the U.N.
Conference on the Human Environment cemented international
environmental law as the premiere area of law giving credence to
CDR, and recognized the need to protect the environment for present
and future generations, without stifling economic growth.21 Twenty
years later, in one of the most prominent applications of CDR,
Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration on the Environment and
Development explicitly stated for the first time that states "have
common but differentiated responsibilities. 2  Since then, several
MEAs incorporated CDR into their provisions, most notably the
Montreal Protocol and the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
Change.23
20. See Stone, supra note 2, at 278; see also General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade art. 18, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. Al l, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, 252 (giving special
consideration to "contracting parties ... the economies of which can only support
low standards of living and are in the early stages of development"); Constitution
of the International Labour Organisation art. 427, June 28, 1919, 49 Stat. 2712,
2733-34, 225 Consol. T.S. 188, 385 (stating that differences of "economic
opportunity" make it unlikely that all states would be able to adhere to universal
labor standards immediately).
21. Conference on the Human Environment, June 5-16, 1972, Report of the
U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Declaration of the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment, princ. 9, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.48/14/Rev. 1
(Jan. 1, 1973) (taking into account developing countries' special economic
situations and pledging to give them financial and technical assistance in making
environmentally sound choices); see also Stone, supra note 2, at 279 (describing
the environment as the "most fertile field for nonuniform obligations"); Weisslitz,
supra note 2, at 480-81 (highlighting developing countries' concern that
prioritizing environmental issues over economic growth would stifle and impair
their fragile economies).
22. See U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, June 3-14, 1992,
Report of the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development, princ. 7, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 151/26/Rev. 1 (Jan.
1, 1993) (recognizing that developed countries have contributed more to the source
of global environmental concerns and acknowledging that the responsibility lies
with them to lead the pursuit for solutions).
23. Compare Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 3, May 9, 1992,
S. TREATY Doc. No. 102-38 (1992), 1771 U.N.T.S. 165, 169 (adopting the phrase
CDR and declaring that parties should protect the climate system "in accordance
with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities"),
with Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, art. 5, 1522 U.N.T.S. at 34 (applying the
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B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL
AND THE INCORPORATION OF CDR
In the early 1970s, scientists first theorized that emissions of
nitrogen oxides, or halocarbons, could reach and damage the
stratosphere ten to fifteen kilometers above the earth's surface. " This
layer protects the earth and its inhabitants from excessive ultraviolet
("UV") radiation, which can increase the incidence of skin cancer
and cataracts, harm the body's immune system, and diminish the
value of plant and food crops.25
In 1977, the U.N. Environment Programme ("UNEP") established
a committee for further study of the ozone problem and initiated
diplomatic discussions to explore solutions.26 The initial result of
these discussions was the Vienna Convention for the Protection of
the Ozone Layer in 1985.27 However, the Vienna Convention was
only a framework convention, providing for further Protocols to
address ozone depletion.28  The 1987 Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer was the final product of
these diplomatic efforts.2 9
principle without explicitly using the phrase by requiring developed countries to
halt production of CFCs ten years before developing countries), and Convention
on Biological Diversity art. 20(7), June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 143, 156 (giving
"consideration ... to the special situation of developing countries").
24. See Sarma, supra note 8, at 293-94 (noting that despite the damage
halocarbons-first invented in 1928--could cause, they were useful because of
their long life and diverse functions in many industries, such as refrigeration, air
conditioning, metal cleaning, and fire fighting).
25. See U.N. Dev. Programme, Ozone Problem, http://www.undp.org/
montrealprotocol/ozone.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2006) (noting that since CFCs
and other ODS can stay in the earth's atmosphere for as long as one hundred years,
the threat to the ozone layer is ongoing, even after humans discontinue their use of
CFCs).
26. See Sarma, supra note 8, at 294 (reporting that to foster these efforts, the
UNEP started the Coordinating Committee on the Ozone Layer).
27. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer pmbl., Mar. 22,
1985, T.I.A.S. No. 11,097, 1513 U.N.T.S. 324, 325 (recognizing the need to
conduct more research of the ozone layer in furtherance of its determination to
protect humans from the ozone layer's adverse effects).
28. See id. art. 8, 1513 U.N.T.S. at 329.
29. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, pmbl., 1522 U.N.T.S. at 29; see also
Sarma, supra note 8, at 294 (describing the Protocol's unique initial structure, in
20061 469
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The Montreal Protocol was one of the first MEAs to incorporate
CDR through its differential treatment of developed and developing
countries.3" Although the Protocol does not explicitly use the phrase
"common but differentiated responsibility," it includes a number of
CDR provisions.3 Article 5 famously gives developing countries, the
"Article 5 Countries" ("A5Cs"), a ten-year grace period to comply
with the treaty.32 Article 9 mandates that parties cooperate in
promoting "research, development, and exchange of [scientific]
information."33 Article 10 provides for a financial mechanism, to
which developed countries must contribute to fund implementation
projects in the developing world.34 Moreover, Article 10A mandates
parties to transfer available substitutes and technologies for ODS to
developing countries.35
which it listed only eight ODS and prescribed mild control measures, but did so by
allowing adjustments and amendments for new technological and scientific
developments).
30. See ASIL Proceedings 2002, supra note 17, at 361 (remarks of Susan
Biniaz) (describing the Montreal Protocol as "an excellent example of an
instrument that came before the articulation of any principle [of CDR]").
31. See Sarma, supra note 8, at 308 (noting that the drafters of the Protocol
recognized that over eighty-five percent of the world's consumption of ODS
comes from developed states, so they should bear the brunt of the remedy).
32. London Amendments, supra note 4, art. 5, 30 I.L.M. at 547 (requiring
developed countries to halt production of CFCs in 1996, while giving developing
countries until 2002 to eliminate fifty percent of CFC use, 2007 to eliminate
eighty-five percent, and 2010 for complete phase-out).
33. Id. art. 9, 30 I.L.M. at 549 (obligating exchange of information because the
Protocol takes into account "the needs of developing countries").
34. Id. art. 10, 30 I.L.M. at 549-50 (establishing the Multilateral Fund and an
Executive Committee to oversee the implementation and distribution of the fund
for phase-out projects); see also Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the
Montreal Protocol, Institutional Arrangements, http://www.multilateralfund.org/
institutional arrangements.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2006) (noting that the seven
A5Cs and seven non-A5Cs comprise the Executive Committee, but the daily
operations are carried out by the Montreal Protocol Secretariat).
35. London Amendments, supra note 4, art. 10A, 30 I.L.M. at 550 (stating that
such transfers "occur under fair and most favourable conditions").
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C. COMPLIANCE THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL
1. Compliance and Why Scholars Consider It Important
Today more than nine hundred international legal instruments
either involve or contain important provisions regarding the
environment.36 The international community intends for MEAs to
influence the behavior of both state and many non-state actors
through provisions that carry substantial costs to these actors."
Although the principle pacta sunt servanda requires all parties to a
treaty to comply in good faith, noncompliance with MEAs is
common.3" Such noncompliance with treaty obligations diminishes
the value of well-drafted legal instruments.39
"Compliance" measures the behavior of the targeted actors of an
agreement,40  focusing on whether a state complies with
36. Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson, Strengthening National
Compliance with International Environmental Agreements, in MAKING LAW
WORK: ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra
note 8, at 179, 179 (remarking that most of these instruments are legally binding,
and as such, they are the international law's primary means of effecting state
behavior).
37. See id.
38. See Kal Raustiala, Reporting and Review Institutions in 10 Multilateral
Environmental Agreements, in MAKING LAW WORK: ENVIRONMENTAL
COMPLIANCE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 8, at 233, 233
(observing a wide gap between the law of treaties and state behavior); see also
Birnie & Boyle, supra note 1, at 13 (translating pacta sunt servanda to mean
"treaties are made to be kept"); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties pmbl.,
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332, 332 (noting that the principle ofpacta sunt
servanda is "universally recognized").
39. See NEUMAYER, supra note 11, at 4 (arguing that rules "are not worth the
paper they are written on if the same rules are not complied with...").
40. See Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, Compliance
with International Standards: Environmental Case Studies, 89 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 206, 211-12 (1995) [hereinafter ASIL Proceedings 1995] (remarks of Edith
Brown Weiss) (explaining that no empirical method measures compliance, making
compliance a matter of judgment); see also Weiss & Jacobson, supra note 36, at
181 (explaining that treaties are meant to target not only the behavior of states, but
also many non-state actors like industries, nongovernmental organizations, and
individuals).
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implementing actions in practice, not just on paper.41 This is to be
distinguished from the distinct concept of "effectiveness" of an
agreement, which refers to whether the parties are achieving the
purposes of the treaty.42
Scholars maintain that the two most critical factors that affect
compliance are a state's capacity and intent to meet the treaty
terms. 43 To have the requisite capacity, states need economic
resources, but equally important are a transparent bureaucracy,
public support, and technical expertise. 44 State intent, which is often
difficult to ascertain,45 can prove problematic because agreement at a
formal meeting may not reflect the state's national practices.46
41. See ASIL Proceedings 1995, supra note 40, at 211-12 (observing that the
real goal of compliance is to change the behavior of states, so that states fulfill both
the letter and the spirit of treaties); see also Kal Raustiala, Compliance and
Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
L. 387, 392-93 (2000) (arguing that to understand compliance fully, it is useful to
distinguish compliance from related topics like implementation and enforcement);
Edith Brown Weiss, Understanding Compliance with International Environmental
Agreements: The Baker's Dozen Myths, 32 U. RICH. L. REv. 1555, 1562 (1999)
(explaining that "implementation" refers to the actions that a country takes to give
effect to a treaty, like the adoption of legislation, regulations, or judicial decrees).
"Enforcement," the punitive arm to compliance, is a backward-looking concept
that focuses on bringing states into compliance after they violate agreements. Id. at
1564.
42. See Markus Ehrmann, Procedures of Compliance Control in International
Environmental Treaties, 13 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 377, 378 (2002)
(theorizing that a high degree of compliance could still fail to make a treaty
effective, such as when an "emission reduction of a certain hazardous substance is
not likely to actually protect the environment").
43. See, e.g., Weiss & Jacobson, supra note 36, at 181 (arguing that empirical
studies prove that a composite of a country's intent and its capacity are the causes
of either compliance or noncompliance).
44. See id. (noting that a state's capacity to comply likely will evolve, but an
acute issue for states is the prioritization of the resources it does have); see also
Ehrmann, supra note 42, at 388-89 (observing that because modem treaties aim to
affect not only state behavior, but that of industries, NGOs and individuals, the
treaties put enormous administrative and financial pressure on governments,
sometimes crippling their capacity for compliance).
45. See Weiss & Jacobson, supra note 36, at 181 (noting that the only way to
determine a state's intent is to analyze its behavior, which may be ambiguous and
contradictory at times).
46. See id. (cautioning that a state's formal vote at an intemational meeting
may not be the true intent of the state).
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Because treaties are also political instruments, there are many
reasons why a state may sign a treaty and intent to comply may not
necessarily be one of those reasons.47 Even if a state intends to
comply initially, it may find later that it lacks the national political
will to give the attention and resources needed for compliance.48
2. Enforcement Strategies to Encourage Compliance
Three common types of international legal strategies promote
compliance with treaties: (1) negative incentives, which include
penalties and sanctions; (2) the "sunshine" method, which entails
monitoring, reporting and NGO participation; and (3) positive
incentives, which include financial and technical incentives.49
Traditional international law remedies for breach of an agreement, as
codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, also
apply."
International environmental law tends to prefer the "carrot
approach," through positive incentives, rather than punitive "sticks,"
to encourage compliance with MEAs5 1 Because many proponents of
the carrot approach argue that noncompliance is a result of a lack of
capacity, these commentators do not believe that punitive measures
47. See Weiss, supra note 41, at 1559 (highlighting the many reasons why a
state signs a treaty, such as responding to bribes by other states or simply to
alleviate international pressure).
48. See Weiss & Jacobson, supra note 36, at 182 (finding that states may want
to comply in the abstract, but the treaty quickly becomes too low of a priority for
the state to put its paper obligations into action).
49. See id. at 182-91 (noting that -negative incentives, like sanctions and the
withdrawal of privileges, are most common in trade law, in which parties ban trade
in certain products with violators of the agreement or deny privileges under that
agreement to the violating party). For the "sunshine" approach, proponents of this
strategy rely on the "reputation" factor of a party to induce compliance, where
monitoring and reporting of parties' practices become public. Id. International
agreements that rely heavily on positive incentives, like financial and technical
assistance or other assistance outside the convention framework, do so to target the
lack of capacity in countries. Id.
50. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 38, art. 60, 1155
U.N.T.S. at 346 (setting for the appropriate remedial actions for material breaches
of a bilateral or multilateral treaty).
51. See Weiss, supra note 41, at 1584; see also NEUMAYER, supra note 11, at
2006]
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
would improve compliance.52 Accordingly, punitive measures are
uncommon in international environmental law.53
Scholars favor the carrot approach because compliance theory
roots itself in the rational actor model, in which the actor applies
science to policy through a rational legislative and administrative
system.54 To this end, many scholars observe that when there is
compliance, it stems from some notion of reciprocity, where the state
realizes its best interests are to meet the treaty terms. 5 But these
scholars recognize that this principle does not operate conversely-
noncompliance is not a result of a traditional cost/benefit analysis,
but instead of other circumstances.56
52. See NEUMAYER, supra note 11, at 12 (advocating the use of "carrots,"
because "sticks" merely punish the recipient state and do nothing to enhance that
state's capacity to comply); see also Ehrmann, supra note 42, at 387 (reporting that
those scholars who support the theory that intentional noncompliance and willful
disobedience is the exception rather than the rule advocate a "cooperative
approach" or "partnership method" to treaty management).
53. See Weiss & Jacobson, supra note 36, at 190 (stating that neither sanctions
nor formal dispute resolution mechanisms are prevalent in this field of law). But
see ASIL Proceedings 1995, supra note 40, at 212 (remarks of Edith Brown
Weiss) (noting that formal sanctions are a major factor in trade-related
environmental activities); Peter H. Sand, Sanctions in Case of Non-Compliance
and State Responsibility: Pacta Sunt Servanda - or Else?, in MAKING LAW WORK:
ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 8, at
265, 267 (reporting that the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora ("CITES") made coercive the use of sanctions in
at least forty cases).
54. See Piers Blaikie & John Mope Simo, Cameroon 's Environmental Accords:
Signed, Sealed, but Undelivered, in MAKING LAW WORK: ENVIRONMENTAL
COMPLIANCE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 8, at 338 (noting that
theories of compliance with international environmental law originate from the
notions of the rational actor model, in which a state has an efficient, rational
administration and the legitimacy to carry out beneficial programs).
55. See Ehrmann, supra note 42, at 387 (explaining that although treaties are
the result of compromise, states generally realize the benefit of complying because
during the development of a treaty, states already brought their interests to the
table, and the treaty is likely to represent those interests).
56. See id. (arguing that when a state does not comply, it is generally the result
of "unplanned circumstances," like a change in financial position, and not because
the divergent state thinks its best interest is to disobey).
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3. The Montreal Protocol's Progressive Structure
Stemming from the rational actor theory and thus assuming that
states realize that a reduction in ODS use is in their best interests, the
parties to the Montreal Protocol use the encouragement-based
approach to compliance.57 For instance, Article 10's notable
compliance assistance provisions are the Multilateral Fund, which
meets the implementation costs of A5Cs, and the requirement of
technology transfer to A5Cs. 58 Similarly, Article 5 provides that if an
A5C has difficulty meeting its obligations, then the parties will take
no action against the A5C until a Meeting of the Parties decides upon
an appropriate non-punitive action. 9 The Meeting of the Parties
provides regular opportunities to review the implementation of the
Protocol and make any necessary adjustments.60 In addition, Article 7
requires parties to submit regular reports of their ODS use to the
Secretariat. 6' The Implementation Committee, which reviews
complaints of noncompliance, can make recommendations to a
Meeting of the Parties about how to bring the noncomplying party
back into compliance.62
57. See id. at 393 (noting that during later Meetings of the Parties to discuss the
future of the noncompliance procedure, developing countries favored the
"encouragement-based approach," and won this debate over countries like the
United States, which called for trade sanctions).
58. London Amendments, supra note 4, art. 10, 30 I.L.M. at 550-51
(establishing that non-A5Cs will fund the financial mechanism and make their best
efforts to transfer technology and ODS substitutes to A5Cs). The U.N.
Development Programme, the U.N. Environment Programme, and the World Bank
act as the Fund's implementation agencies, giving advice and expertise to the
parties. Id.
59. Id. art. 5, 30 I.L.M. at 548 (giving all the parties an opportunity to deal with
noncompliance in a particular manner, rather than by rote punishment).
60. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, art. 11, 1522 U.N.T.S. at 36-37 (declaring
that parties should hold these meetings at "regular intervals" and giving a
comprehensive list of the meetings' functions).
61. London Amendments, supra note 4, art. 7, 30 I.L.M. at 549 (requiring each
party to submit statistical data on its ODS use, or its best possible estimates where
the data is unavailable).
62. U.N. EP, Report of the Second Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, annex 3, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3 (June 29, 1990) (establishing the Implementation Committee,
which is comprised of five parties elected for two-year periods).
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Article 8 provides the backdrop for the formal noncompliance
procedure ("NCP"), and reads that, at a meeting, parties shall work to
determine what noncompliance is and how to redress it. 63 At the
Fourth Meeting of Parties in 1992, the parties adopted the NCP,
which applies to all parties and excludes formal trade sanctions as a
remedy for noncompliance. 64 The NCP's remedial options include
the issuance of warnings and the donation of more assistance to
ensure compliance.65
D. WEAK STATES AND THE REALITY OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
As capacities of states vary greatly in the international community
today, a continuum of states emerges, ranging from strong to weak to
failed.6 6 The distinguishing criterion between a strong and a weak
state is the state's ability to provide political goods-intangible
expectations and obligations that compose the social contract
between a government and its citizens.67 The most "critical" political
good is the supply of human security, the primary function of
states.
68
63. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, art. 8, 1522 U.N.T.S. at 35 (noting that no
NCP is set at the time of drafting, but parties will create it at their meetings).
64. See U.N. EP, Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, annex 5, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/15 (Nov. 25, 1992) [hereinafter Fourth Meeting] (adopting the
NCP as an annex to the Protocol and providing for a withdrawal of rights and
privileges, rather than "trade sanctions").
65. Contra id. annex 5 (including in the list of measures against noncompliance
the suspension of certain rights and privileges under the Protocol).
66. See Rotberg, supra note 12, at 3 (noting that the sheer increase in the
number of states in the last century increased the range of economic productivity
and social and political ambitions among states).
67. See id. at 3-4 (describing the social contract as the citizens giving the right
to rule, and in turn the rulers providing the expected political goods to the citizens).
68. See id. at 3 (noting that the effectiveness of the state's "full spectrum of
public security" cannot be mimicked by non-state actors); see also JEREMY M.
WEINSTEIN ET AL., COMMISSION ON WEAK STATES AND NATIONAL SECURITY, ON
THE BRINK: WEAK STATES AND US NATIONAL SECURITY 19 (2004),
http://www.cgdev.org/doc/books/weakstates/FullReport.pdf (citing security as the
first capability that a state ought to provide). The next level of political goods is
legitimacy, in the form of enforceable rule of law and citizen participation in
political processes, which help to ensure "fair play." Rotberg, supra note 12, at 3;
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Strong states perform well across all categories of political goods,
but weak states' performance is mixed.69 Exceptionally weak states
run the risk of becoming failed states, which are those that perform
the worst in all categories and cease to provide peace and order.7 °
Weak states typically harbor intercommunal tensions, have high
crime rates and levels of corruption, low economic performance, and
poor infrastructure and rule of law.7'
E. WEAK STATES' NONCOMPLIANCE WITH
THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL
The Montreal Protocol mandates a staggered total phase-out of
ninety-six listed ODS, grouped in nine categories based on their
ozone-depleting potential and prevalence in industry, with A5C's
obligations at least ten years behind non-A5Cs. 72 The first deadline
see also WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra, at 22 (describing legitimacy, in part, as the
ability of a government to maintain its citizens' confidence). Last is the general
capacity of a state to meet its citizens' basic needs, through measures like a
physical infrastructure and a banking and educational system. Rotberg, supra note
12, at 3-4; WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra, at 21-22 (noting that when a state lacks this
capacity, it leaves its citizens open to humanitarian crises like epidemics and
hunger).
69. See Rotberg, supra note 12, at 4 (explaining that the more poorly a state
performs, the weaker it is); see also WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 68, at 19 (noting
that in a weak state, there is a "gap" between how it delivers security, legitimacy,
or capacity, and how a functioning state ought to perform).
70. See Rotberg, supra note 12, at 5 (defining a failed state as a deeply
conflicted and dangerous state with great intercommunal tensions that often lead to
intense violence among civil society and between civilians and the government).
71. See Lobe, supra note 10 (noting that the gaps in security, legitimacy, and
capacity distinguish a weak state from a merely poor state); see also ANITA
SUNDARI AKELLA & JAMES B. CANNON, CONSERVATION INT'L, CTR. FOR
CONSERVATION AND GOV'T, STRENGTHENING THE WEAKEST LINKS: STRATEGIES
FOR IMPROVING THE ENFORCEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS GLOBALLY 22-23
(2004), http://www.conservation.org/ImageCache/CIWEB/content/programs/poli
cy/ccgenforcementreport_2epdf/v 1/ccgenforcementreport.pdf (referring to
legislation in the environmental arena, where weak states have poor legislation that
suffers from inconsistencies and lack of clarity).
72. See OZONE SECRETARIAT, supra note 4, annexes A-E (listing all the
controlled substances as adjusted and amended); see also Sarma, supra note 8, at
294 (noting that the phase-out timetables are gradual because the first deadline is a
freeze of consumption, according to the levels of ODS a state needs for its
industries, referred to as its "base-line data").
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for A5Cs came as a 1999 requirement to freeze parties' consumption
levels of chlorofluorocarbons ("CFCs"), with total phase-out
currently set at 2010. 73 Examples of weak states that are not
complying or potentially not complying with the Montreal Protocol's
regulation of ODS include Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Fiji, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Lebanon,
Lesotho, and the Philippines. 4
The most common noncompliance issue is the failure of parties to
submit regular reports on ODS use to the Secretariat.75 The reporting
requirement sets the entire NCP into motion by allowing the
Implementation Committee to obtain data regarding use of ODS in
that state and encouraging the Meeting of the Parties to make
recommendations if a state is noncompliant.76
Another pressing problem with noncompliance is illegal trade in
ODS.77 In the mid-1990s, illegal trade accounted for up to fifteen
73. See Phase Out Targets, supra note 8 (noting that after the CFC freeze dates
are halons in 2002 and methyl chloroform in 2003 for A5Cs); see also U.N. EP,
OzonAction Programme, Glossary, Websites and References, ILLEGAL TRADE IN
OZONE DEPLETING SUBSTANCES: Is THERE A HOLE IN THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL?,
2001, at 27, http://www.uneptie.org/ozonaction/library/mmcfiles/3617-e-oansupp
lement6lllegalTrade.pdf (identifying CFCs as chemicals that contain chlorine,
fluorine, and carbon, used as refrigerants, aerosol propellants, cleaning solvents,
and in foam). Halons are brominated chemicals related to CFCs and used primarily
in firefighting. Id.
74. See U.N. EP, Report of the Sixteenth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, decs. XVI/20-3 1, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/OzL.Pro.16/17 (Dec. 16, 2004) [hereinafter Sixteenth Meeting]; see also
Rotberg, supra note 12, at 5, 17 (classifying Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iran, Fiji,
Libya, Lebanon, and the Philippines as weak states due to their serious internal
tensions, communal discontent, and government corruption and illegitimacy); U.N.
EP, OzonAction Programme, Countries Operating Under Article 5, Paragraph 1 of
the Montreal Protocol, http://www.uneptie.org/ozonaction/compliance/protocol/
article5.html (listing all of the states operating under Article 5 of the Protocol).
75. See ASIL Proceedings 1995, supra note 40, at 209 (remarks of Winfried
Lang) (noting that many states do not comply with the data reporting requirements,
due to a lack of capacity and/or intent).
76. See id. at 209-10.
77. See Sixteenth Meeting, supra note 74, 317 (agreeing that illegal trade is
one of the most "significant obstacles" the Protocol faces and requires "urgent
action"); see also NEUMAYER, supra note 11, at 42 (referring to illegal trade as the
"most important" noncompliance issue the Protocol faces).
478 [21:461
THE OZONE TREA TY. WEAK STA TES AND CDR
percent of the world trade in CFCs and halons.78 Today, although the
extent of the black-market is unknown, this illegal trade is a highly
lucrative business. 79 Among other weak states, Eastern European
countries with economies in transition ("CEITs") are particularly
susceptible to the black market.80 Although all the CEITs faced
political and economic upheaval after the dissolution of the Soviet
Union, the Montreal Protocol labeled half of the CEITs as
developing and half as developed, irrespective of the fact that most
share the common difficulties of meeting their obligations.81
II. ANALYSIS
A. THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN MODERN COMPLIANCE
THEORY AND WEAK STATES
Modem compliance theory of international environmental law,
based on the rational actor theory, does not appreciate the realities of
78. Duncan Brack, The Scope of the Problem: An Overview of Illegal ODS
Trade, ILLEGAL TRADE IN OZONE DEPLETING SUBSTANCES: Is THERE A HOLE IN
THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL?, 2001, at 4, http://www.uneptie.org/ozonaction/
library/mmcfiles/3617-e-oansupplement6lllegalTrade.pdf (noting that the 1990s
was when regulators first discovered illegal trade in CFCs, and the major trafficker
was "almost certainly" Russia).
79. See DeSombre, supra note 9, at 63 (highlighting that in some U.S. ports,
CFC smuggling is second in value to narcotics smuggling).
80. See U.N. EP, supra note 73, at 27 (defining CEITs as "Eastern European
countries of the former Soviet Bloc who are transitioning from communism to a
free-market economy"); see also DeSombre, supra note 9, at 64 (noting that
financial incentives to sell illicit CFCs on the black market increase when a state
experiences economic hardships).
81. See RASMUS RASMUSSON ET AL., U.N. EP, OZONACTION PROGRAMME, A
COUNTRY-DRIVEN APPROACH TO THE PHASEOUT OF OZONE-DEPLETING
SUBSTANCES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 73 (2001), http://www.uneptie.org/
ozonaction/library/mmcfiles/3394-e.pdf (listing the non-Article 5 CEITS as:
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
Ukraine, and Uzbekistan). The eleven remaining CEITs are A5Cs. Id.; see also
Volodymyr Demkine, Facing the Challenge in Countries with Economies in
Transition, ILLEGAL TRADE IN OZONE DEPLETING SUBSTANCES: Is THERE A HOLE
IN THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL?, 2001, at 9, http://www.uneptie.org/ozonaction/
library/mmcfiles/3617-e-oansupplement6lllegalTrade.pdf (citing specific common
problems in these countries, such as a lack of funding and institutional capacity,
and inadequate information and training on the Montreal Protocol).
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weak states. Weak states are notorious for being inefficient, corrupt,
and sometimes irrational.82 Because the Montreal Protocol, like
modem compliance theory, also stems from this progressive school
of thought, the framers of the Montreal Protocol erroneously
assumed that all its parties are rational actors. Because of these
assumptions, parties now attribute noncompliance to a lack of
capacity, not the intent to comply.
83
The Montreal Protocol's positive incentive structure is
problematic for two principal reasons. First, it does not address
willful disobedience or lack of intent to comply. Provisions such as
Article 5's grace period and Article 10's technical and financial
assistance address states' capacity, not their intent.84 As weak states
have unique agendas, like mending their broken economies, they
may take advantage of the lax obligations for developing countries
and concentrate on their domestic problems rather than on
international agreements.85
Second, even where a weak state may have the requisite intent to
comply, the Montreal Protocol's compliance assistance provisions do
not enhance weak states' capacity enough to enable their effective
implementation of the Protocol. The technical and financial
82. See Rotberg, supra note 12, at 3-5 (noting that despots often rule weak
states, whose governments are corrupt and lack transparency); see also Blaikie &
Simo, supra note 54, at 339-40 (generalizing that colonialism truly left its mark on
the socio-political system in Africa, where many "bureaucratic behaviors ... are
inimical to rational decision-making, leadership, and economic growth").
83. See Sarma, supra note 8, at 312 (reporting that the framers of the Protocol
thought that noncompliance was a lack of not only administrative and financial
capacity, but also of the capacity to inform its citizens of the dangers of ozone
depletion). In addition, the framers chose this progressive structure in fear that
harsher measures may drive a state to illegal trade in ODS. Id.
84. See London Amendments, supra note 4, arts. 5, 10, 30 I.L.M. at 547-48,
550 (giving a ten-year delay in obligations to developing countries and mandating
that developed countries implement their obligations by giving assistance to
developing countries); see also Weiss & Jacobson, supra note 36, at 187 (noting
that assistance is an effective strategy only where the state wants to comply);
Fourth Meeting, supra note 64, annex 5 (listing more technical and financial
assistance as a remedial option for dealing with a noncompliant state).
85. See Blaikie & Simo, supra note 54, at 337 (predicting that the "laxity" of
the Montreal Protocol's provisions may make a country like Cameroon, ravaged by
economic crisis and political corruption, "less committed" to implementing the
agreement).
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assistance of Articles 9 and 10 are short-term aids for weak states,
but do nothing to strengthen their socio-political systems for the
future.86 An independent judiciary, transparent government, educated
and trained bureaucracy, and citizen respect for the rule of law are
critical to translating an international accord into local law.87 Without
strengthening these institutions, it is unlikely that weak states will
use the assistance to the fullest extent possible.88 Thus, the modem
compliance theory evident in the Montreal Protocol's positive
incentive structure does not address the behavior and needs of weak
states.
B. ARTICLE 5's GRACE PERIOD AND ITS CONTRIBUTION
TO THE BLACK MARKET
In addition to addressing only states' capacity to comply, Article 5
is also problematic because its differential phase-out dates contribute
to the black market economy in ODS trade.89 During Article 5's
grace period, A5Cs can produce and consume ODS legally, even
while the Protocol mandates that consumption in the developed
world cease. 90 When regulators ban the production or use of any
substance and alternatives are less attractive, the risk of illegal trade
86. See Mark A. Drumbl, Does Sharing Know Its Limits? Thoughts on
Implementing International Agreements: A Review of National Environmental
Policies, A Comparative Study of Capacity-Building, 18 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 281, 299
(1999) (arguing that the transfer of technology and money leave much to be
desired for true capacity-building, which demands a restructuring of the financial,
political, and social institutions of a country).
87. See ASIL Proceedings 1995, supra note 40, at 207, 213 (remarks by
Winfried Lang & Edith Brown Weiss) (describing these domestic factors as the
most influential on national compliance with international agreements).
88. See id. at 213 (remarks by Edith Brown Weiss) (urging the need "to do
more" with compliance assistance because in countries with particularly weak
institutions, the money does not go far).
89. See Brack, supra note 78, at 4 (anticipating that as the trade in CFCs and
halons diminishes, illegal trade in other ODS substances with later phase-out
schedules, like methyl bromide and hydrochloroflurocarbons ("HCFCs"), will
develop).
90. London Amendments, supra note 4, art. 5, 30 I.L.M. at 547 (allowing the
A5Cs to produce and consume ODS legally for ten years after the non-A5Cs must
halt their use); see also DeSombre, supra note 9, at 49 (referring to the dichotomy
of Article 5's obligations for developed and developing states).
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typically arises.91 The fact that Article 5 allows A5Cs to use ODS
legally, well past the deadlines for non-A5Cs, makes illegal trade
even more likely.92 Further, when national regulations forbid using
certain products while the use of the same products in other countries
are less regulated, demand will drive the black market.93 In this case,
non-A5Cs, like the United States, have high excise taxes on ODS,
which increases demand for cheaper, illegal ODS.94 Thus, Article 5's
grace period inadvertently provides the demand and supply needed
for a black market economy in ODS.
1. The CEITs as Proof of the Importance of Correctly Adjudging a
State 's Capacity and Administering Obligations Accordingly
The special case of the CEITs presents a new obstacle to
managing illegal trade in ODS, indicating that Article 5 does not
fulfill the Montreal Protocol's goal.95 Although the Protocol
attempted to rectify the CEITs' inability to comply by permitting
non-Article 5 CEITs to consume ODS for non-essential uses, Article
91. See Brack, supra note 78, at 4 (noting that more expensive alternatives are
an incentive for illegal trade in all areas of environmental policy, especially in
hazardous waste and endangered species). But not all the ODS alternatives are
more expensive, such as the alternatives in solvents and aerosol industries. Id.
However, alternatives in the refrigeration and air-conditioning industries require
retrofitting of old technology, which is a more expensive process than simply using
ODS. Id.
92. See id. (explaining that developing countries are producing or consuming
ODS while the Protocol bans their use in developed countries, and this provides an
easy supply of a product in high demand).
93. See DeSombre, supra note 9, at 65.
94. See id. (noting that some Americans in need of ODS prefer the cheaper,
albeit illegal, ODS available through the black market).
95. See Demkine, supra note 81, at 9 (noting that illegal trade in ODS in the
CEITs is a "cause of serious concern" because CEITs have so many difficulties
complying with the Protocol); see also RASMUSSON, supra note 81, at 70 (dividing
the CEIT region into Central Europe: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia,
Slovenia; Southeastern Europe: Bulgaria, Albania, Croatia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Macedonia, Romania, and the former Republic of Yugoslavia and
the Newly Independent States: Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Belarus, Ukraine,
Russia, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan). All twenty-seven of these countries have ratified the
Montreal Protocol. Id.
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5 is still insufficient.96 Several CEITS remain in a state of
noncompliance, and there is speculation that illegal trade takes place
between the CEITs themselves. 97 For example, the region's only
major producer of ODS, Russia, has supplied ODS to other CEITs,
and estimates reveal that most of the ODS entering Europe and the
United States originates in Russia.98 These estimates reveal that the
CEITs exploit Article 5's grace period to trade and consume ODS
illegally.
The Protocol's classification of the CEITs also fails to take note of
the regional subdivisions that embody significant economic and
political differences among the states. 99 Because countries in these
regions share so many characteristics, the prospects for future
compliance in the CEITs relate directly to these subdivisions. 00
The first of these subdivisions is Central European CEITs, which
are likely in the best position for Article 5 compliance, as these states
enjoyed a smoother economic transition to a modern, industrialized
economy, and they are more politically and economically engaged
with the European Union. 10 1 In contrast, prospects for Article 5
compliance in the second subdivision, the Southeastern European
96. See U.N. EP, Report of the Tenth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, decs. X/20-28, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/OzL.Pro.10/9 (Dec. 3, 1998) (realizing that even the non-Article 5 CEITs
were too weak to fulfill their obligations, so the Meeting extended non-Article 5
CEITs' deadlines for non-essential uses until 2002).
97. See Sixteenth Meeting, supra note 74, dec. XVI/21 (noting "with great
concern" that data for 2001-2003 puts Azerbaijan in compliance with its
obligations under Article 2A); see also Demkine, supra note 81, at 9 (explaining
that because several CEITs are noncompliant, it is likely that they obtain the illicit
ODS through illegal trade).
98. See Brack, supra note 78, at 9 (reporting that customs officers conclusively
identified Russia as the origin of a substantial amount of illicit ODS).
99. See RASMUSSON, supra note 81, at 70 (categorizing the CEITs as Central
Europe, Southeastern Europe, and the Newly Independent States ("NIS")).
100. See id.
101. See id. at 83-84 (noting that these states' somewhat attractive economies
make them significant trading partners with the EU, which opens the doors for EU
accession, and the prospect of accession creates market and political incentives for
compliance with the Protocol and also with EU environmental legislation). For
example, compliance in Slovenia has been successful, with "virtually all of Annex
A and B consumption phased out by 1996." Id. at 83.
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CEITs, are more dismal, partly due to the former totalitarian regimes
and sporadic resurgence of ethnic conflict in these states.02 Finally,
prospects for compliance in the third subdivision, the Newly
Independent States ("NIS") CEITs, combine the two extremes. In the
European NIS (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), EU accession is the
incentive for compliance.0 3
However, the classification of the Central Asian and Caucasus
CEITs as mostly non-A5Cs (therefore obligating them to contribute
to the Protocol's funding mechanism), and those states therefore
lagged significantly in ratifying the London Amendment that created
Article 5. 04 The somewhat arbitrary classification of only half the
CEITs as A5Cs led to the evasion of strict and premature obligations,
thereby indicating that an alternative type of classification is crucial
for success.
2. Other Weak States as Breeding Grounds for ODS Trafficking
The rise of the black market in other weak states also casts doubt
on the efficacy of Article 5's structure. Weak states, with loose
customs regulations and border controls, are the ideal transit point
for traffickers."0 5 Weak states help fuel the frequent "triangulation"
trade, where a non-A5C produces ODS legally, exports the ODS
102. See id. at 84 (highlighting the cases of Albania and Bosnia and
Herzegovina, whose functioning is so weak, they are in "flagrant violation of even
the reporting requirements of the Protocol"). In this region, governments focus "on
the short-term survival of enterprises and society." Id.
103. See id. at 85 (noting that these countries have an extra incentive to conform
to EU environmental policies, which are among the most progressive).
104. See id. (referring to the 1990 London Amendment, which requires all non-
Article 5 countries to contribute to the Multilateral Fund, in the spirit of global
partnership). These countries had lower GDPs and a difficult economic transition,
so contributing to the fund was not feasible. Id. Delays in ratification resulted in
delays in the formulation of implementation projects, so compared to their
European counterparts, they were far behind. Id.
105. See, e.g., Julie Newman, The Tricks of Illegal Trade: How Criminals
Smuggle ODS, ILLEGAL TRADE IN OZONE DEPLETING SUBSTANCES: Is THERE A
HOLE IN THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL?, 2001, at 19, http://www.uneptie.
org/ozonaction/library/mmcfiles/3617-e-oansupplement6IllegalTrade.pdf (citing
detected smuggling schemes in Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam).
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legally to an A5C, which then illegally re-imports the materials
through a host of countries.10 6
Unfortunately, the problem might worsen: the 1999 freeze for
A5Cs has taken effect, and as the global supply of ODS decreases,
the scarcity of the chemicals may drive up the market price, refueling
the black market.07 Article 5's current structure addresses the
capacity of weak states to comply with the Montreal Protocol by
extending their deadlines, but does little to bolster their compliance
in light of the financial benefits from illegal trade.' °8
C. WEAK STATES OFTEN FAIL TO MEET ARTICLE 7'S
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
By not fulfilling the reporting requirements, weak states thwart the
purpose of Article 7, which is to give the Implementation Committee
a chance to monitor ODS use and determine noncompliance. 0 9 Thus,
as Article 7 stands, it is incredibly difficult to determine whether
weak states are meeting their obligations to reduce ODS use.
106. See Brack, supra note 78, at 6 (noting that former European colonies in the
developing world, such as Africa, "have often been used as re-entry points"); see
also Newman, supra note 105, at 14-15 (reporting another major transit route in
smuggled CFCs, which ends in Miami by way of a number of small, offshore
Caribbean islands).
107. See Newman, supra note 105, at 14 (predicting that the demand for the
black market will continue, and smugglers will adapt to new regulations because
"as long as a market for ODS persists, there will always be someone willing to
bend the rules to supply it").
108. For an example of one of the few provisions designed to induce
compliance, see Montreal Amendments, supra note 4, annex 4 (amending the
Protocol by requiring each state to establish a licensing system to help eradicate
illegal ODS trade). However, the efficacy of this amendment is questionable. See
Ezra Clark & Julian Newman, Curbing Illegal Trade in ODS: Why the Montreal
Protocol Needs an Enforcement Assistance Unit, EIA Briefing (Envtl.
Investigation Agency, London, U.K.), July 2002, at 1-2,
http://www.salvonet.com/eia/cgi/reports/report-files/media31-1.pdf (calling the
Montreal Amendment a slow reaction to the problem of illegal trade and
ineffective as an enforcement mechanism, and noting that only about half of the
parties have ratified this amendment).
109. See Sixteenth Meeting, supra note 74, dec. XVI/17 (noting that the Article
7 reporting requirements enable the Implementation Committee to effectively track
the progress of the parties, and also declaring Lesotho noncompliant for failure to
submit reports). Other states that have not submitted reports are Botswana, Liberia,
the Federated States of Micronesia, Turkmenistan, and the Russian Federation. Id.
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Further, although reporting requirements can be a useful tool in
promoting compliance with treaty obligations, there are problems
with their application in weak countries.1 ° First, as the Montreal
Protocol requires self-reporting, in which the state reports on its own
ODS use, these requirements are successful only if countries do not
misrepresent the data."' Weak states' notoriety for corruption creates
a high likelihood of intentionally inaccurate data." 2
Compounding intentional production of misinformation, Article 7
also fails to properly address the fact that weak states generally lack
the capacity to produce accurate data."3 Thus, the existing data for
the monitoring authorities is often unreliable." 4 The amount of time
allocated to the vast undertaking of self-reporting requirements
diverges energies better spent on reaching the substantive targets of
the agreement."5 If weak states do not successfully complete their
reports, then determining their noncompliance will be a difficult feat
for the Implementation Committee and the Secretariat. To be
effective, Article 7 must address this problem.
110. See Weiss & Jacobson, supra note 36, at 182.
111. See id. at 185 (noting that reporting "is linked with transparency to states,"
and that those monitoring compliance rely on this transparency).
112. See, e.g., Sixteenth Meeting, supra note 74, pt. VI (declaring Bangladesh to
be in a state of noncompliance, pursuant to its self-reporting, which indicated ODS
use exceeding the regulations). Bangladesh, in turn, argued that it may have just
made a mistake in its reports, and that it was actually compliant. Id.; see also
Weiss & Jacobson, supra note 36, at 185 (noting that it is common for countries to
report inaccurate data).
113. See ASIL Proceedings 1995, supra note 40, at 213 (remarks of Edith
Brown Weiss) (noting the importance of a country's administrative capacity to
comply effectively with treaty obligations).
114. See RASMUSSON, supra note 81, at 7 (explaining that for many countries,
there is no reliable data to determine how much more ODS these countries need to
phase out).
115. See Weiss & Jacobson, supra note 36, at 185 (noting that scholars refer to
the problem of devoting too much time on reporting as "congestion in treaty
reporting").
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D. ARTICLE 10'S COMPLIANCE ASSISTANCE PROVISIONS ARE
INSUFFICIENT TO INDUCE COMPLIANCE
Article 10 does not fulfill its intended purpose because weak states
are not meeting their targets, despite the compliance assistance that
Article 10's Multilateral Fund and technology transfer provision
provide.'16 Article 10's assistance may be insufficient for weak states
that lack economic and administrative capacity even when compared
to other A5Cs. 1 7 Without efficient institutions, weak states cannot
use these so-called capacity building provisions, and are still in a
poor position to comply. 18 At best, these provisions are "band-aid
solutions" that do not encourage a weak state to deliver long-term
environmental management." 9
Apart from these inadequacies in Article 10, other drawbacks are
associated with its funding provision. Weak states' implementation
programs almost completely depend on the Multilateral Fund to
design and manage their own environmental policies. 20 As a result,
the state has little involvement in managing the environmental
concerns itself, which defeats the purpose of building capacity.' 2'
116. See Sixteenth Meeting, supra note 74, decs. XVI/20-31 (declaring Bosnia
and Herzegovina and Iran, among other weak states, as potentially noncompliant,
and Fiji, Lesotho, and Libya as noncompliant). Potentially noncompliant states will
be formally noncompliant if they do not submit a justified explanation for their
2003 reported data, which indicated high levels of use for the controlled ODS
methyl chloroform. Id.
117. See Drumbl, supra note 86, at 287 (reporting that empirical studies show
that money and technology yields "limited results" when a state's institutions are
weak and capacity is low).
118. See Michael Holley, Sustainable Development in Central America:
Translating Regional Environmental Accords into Domestic Enforcement Action,
25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89, 111 (1998) (noting the danger of leaving environmental
enforcement to weak institutions, whose inevitable enforcement failures could
jeopardize the advancements made on the international level).
119. See Drumbl, supra note 86, at 301.
120. See id. at 302 (reporting that in some developing countries, their national
environmental programs rely on eighty percent of their funding to be through
international aid).
121. See id. (noting that external financial dependence causes a "top-down
communications approach," giving the citizens a lesser role in managing the
environmental issues).
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Further, reliance on the Multilateral Fund creates a moral hazard
for weak states and other A5Cs because it can create a situation in
which these states improve their environmental programs only
enough to make the Multilateral Fund available to them. 12
Alternatively, some states like Iran exploit Article 5, which allows
states to excuse their noncompliance by reference to insufficient
assistance received under Article 10.123 Thus, Article 10's current
structure makes weak states entirely reliant on compliance assistance
without strengthening their own means of implementing the
Montreal Protocol.
E. THE APPLICATION OF THE FORMAL NONCOMPLIANCE
PROCEDURE (NCP) is Too LAX ON WEAK STATES
The NCP is problematic because the parties focus on its
nonconfrontational provisions to address noncompliance and this
myopic approach is not productive when addressing weak states.2 4
Although the NCP provides various routes to ensuring compliance,
the parties-through actions taken at the official "Meetings of the
Parties"-have yet to use all of the provisions available to them.125
The current application of the NCP, which follows in the spirit of the
122. See Desombre, supra note 9, at 73 (warning that developing countries may
forego implementing actions because they can persuade international donors to do
it for them).
123. See London Amendments, supra note 4, art. 5, 30 I.L.M. at 458 (permitting
a party to notify the Secretariat in writing of its inability to meet its control
measures "due to the inadequate implementation of Article 10 and 10A," and the
Secretariat will take this excuse into account at the next Meeting of the Parties);
see also Sixteenth Meeting, supra note 74, pt. VI (reporting that Iran disapproval
when the Meeting of the Parties deemed it noncompliant, and argued that the
Multilateral Fund allegedly did not donate sufficient funds for Iran to meet its
targets); id. dec. XVI/31 (considering requests from Lebanon and the Philippines
to increase their baseline data, which would allow those countries to use more
ODS and remain funded for their implementation efforts).
124. See Raustiala, supra note 41, at 418 (describing the NCP as a "managerial"
process, whereby the parties address a noncompliant state with open discussions
resembling an administrative style, rather than a judicial approach, where the state
in question defends itself through legal arguments).
125. See Fourth Meeting, supra note 64, annex V (providing three remedial
options to noncompliance: more assistance, warnings, and the suspension of rights
and privileges); see also Sarma, supra note 8, at 305 (reporting that parties have
never suspended any rights or privileges of a state).
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Montreal Protocol's encouragement-based approach, fails to fully
utilize the NCP's potential to be a strong enforcement tool. Such
unitary tertiary use of the NCP suggest that the NCP has the potential
to be a stronger enforcement tool than it is now.
A key problem in the NCP exists in the section that allows a party
suspected of noncompliance to permit the Implementation
Committee to conduct information-gathering in its territory, but only
upon invitation by the suspected party." 6 Parties have never used this
provision, for fear of deviating from the consensus process to a
confrontational one, leaving the Implementation Committee to rely
entirely on self-reported data. 27 Weak states that are willfully
disobeying the Protocol are not likely to invite a review body into
their territory, and consequently, there will be no means to detect
their noncompliance.
Further, although the NCP provides that parties can address the
Secretariat with reservations regarding another party's compliance,
no party has used this provision either. 28 This could be a particularly
helpful tool in discovering unscrupulous activity, which the
Secretariat may have no other means of discovering. Again, by not
using these provisions, the parties are not taking full advantage of the
NCP's potential.
Before addressing these problems, the parties should consider the
following observations. Meetings of the Parties have hesitated to
declare any A5C as formally noncompliant for fear of discouraging
their progress.129 When Meetings do address an A5C's official
126. See Fourth Meeting, supra note 64, annex IV (permitting the
Implementation Committee to conduct further investigations when it is suspicious
of a state's behavior).
127. See Sarma, supra note 8, at 302, 312 (noting the Implementation
Committee refrains from any confrontational acts, weary of causing a dispute
between parties, that could then increase ODS use as in retaliation).
128. See Fourth Meeting, supra note 64, annex IV (providing that parties can
address their concerns about other parties to the Secretariat, if they have some
valid and corroborating evidence); see also Sarma, supra note 8, at 303 (noting
that the Implementation Committee has only addressed noncompliance that it
discovered through the regular reports parties submitted to the Secretariat).
129. See Sarma, supra note 8, at 305 (noting that the Meetings first declare an
A5C as "potentially" noncompliant, giving the party in question a second chance
to justify its activities).
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noncompliance, the remedies have been either more international
assistance or mere warnings, but never the third option provided
under the NCP-the suspension of rights and privileges. 130 This
method of assessing warnings and providing additional assistance to
noncomplying parties seems illogical when applied to weak states
that lack the political will to comply with the treaty obligations. As
used currently, the NCP is not tailored in its potential application to
weak states.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
The parties to the Montreal Protocol must account for the behavior
of weak states since the Montreal Protocol's current structure does
not. In designing MEAs, drafters should use a mix of strategies to
ensure that states have both the intent and the capacity to comply
with the terms of the treaty.' The nonconfrontational carrot
approach to compliance is an important component, but the parties to
the Montreal Protocol should use both incentives and disincentives to
address weak states' compliance.
A. TACKLE THE BLACK MARKET WITH POSITIVE
AND NEGATIVE ENFORCEMENT
To manage the black market in ODS, sanctions may be the
appropriate mechanism to deter this highly lucrative illegal
behavior.'32 Other treaty regimes already use sanctions in the area of
illegal trade, yet enforcement practices under the Montreal Protocol
130. See U.N. EP, Report of the Seventh Meeting of Parties to the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, decs. VII/14-19, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/OzL.Pro.7/12 (Dec. 27, 1995) (noting noncompliance by several CEITs,
acknowledging their efforts, and recommending more international assistance as
the remedy); see also Sarma, supra note 8, at 305 (reporting that to date no A5C
has lost its assistance or other rights as a punishment).
131. See Weiss & Jacobson, supra note 36, at 181 (arguing that parties must
employ the appropriate mixture of cooperative and punitive strategies to encourage
compliance in states with different capacities and objectives).
132. See Sand, supra note 53, at 270 (theorizing that sanctions are only effective
when they prohibit access to a commodity that has a great deal of economic clout
for the violating country).
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do not.'33 Trade sanctions could be instrumental against weak states,
whose economies typically are too small to produce ODS
domestically and are dependent on ODS imports. 3 4 If the parties
deem a state noncompliant, then the parties could enact temporary
trade sanctions, which would prohibit ODS imports until the
violating country proves it is not trading illegally any longer.'35
Acknowledging that not all weak states willfully disobey the
Protocol, establishment of an Enforcement Assistance Unit ("EAU")
under the Protocol could also help control the black market. 3 6 The
EAU would gather and analyze data on illegal ODS trade, a task that
also alleviates the burden of reporting on parties.'37 Further, the EAU
could be an expert liaison that trains governments on how to
recognize illegal trade, while coordinating with international law
enforcement agencies like Interpol and the World Customs
Organization.'38 Other treaty regimes already have EAUs, which
133. See ASIL Proceedings 1995, supra note 40, at 212 (remarks of Edith
Brown Weiss) (explaining that sanctions have been relevant only in trade-related
activities of international environmental law, such as the trade in endangered
species).
134. See id. at 212, 217 (noting that sanctions have been successful when treaty
regimes used them against small and weak states to affect a change in domestic
legislation and policy); see also U.N. EP, OzonAction Programme, Frequently
Asked Questions, What Part Have Developing Countries Played in Ozone
Depletion?, http://www.uneptie.org/ozonaction/faq/faq.html#developing (Sept. 8,
2003) (reporting that developing countries typically lack a robust industrialized
economy, so they do not manufacture large quantities of ODS). But in the early
1990s, larger developing countries like India and China began to catch up to the
industrialized world in their ODS production. Id.
135. Cf Sand, supra note 53, at 270.
136. See CLARK & NEWMAN, supra note 108, at 2 (arguing that the Protocol
should establish an EAU, which would give assistance to A5Cs who do not detect
illegal trade).
137. See U.N. EP, Study on Monitoring of International Trade and Prevention of
Illegal Trade in Ozone-Depleting Substances, Mixtures and Products Containing
Ozone-Depleting Substances, 116, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro/WG.1/22/4 (Apr.
23, 2002) [hereinafter Illegal Trade Study] (acknowledging that because developing
countries often lack the capacity to design and implement enforcement operations,
an EAU could aid their efforts).
138. See CLARK & NEWMAN, supra note 108, at 3 (listing the tasks an EAU
could perform with as little as two to three staff members who would collaborate
with other agencies to streamline efforts and enhance intelligence).
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satisfy the dual roles of expert adviser offering assistance and
detector for noncompliance. 13 9
B. DESIGN CAPACITY-BUILDING PROVISIONS FOR WEAK STATES
The Montreal Protocol should increase the participation of
domestic citizens to give weak states true ownership of their
implementation programs and the opportunity to maintain them for
the future. 4 ° While all developing states require capacity
strengthening to implement the Montreal Protocol, weak states need
even more compliance assistance to build capacity.' Without
widened participation, weak states' ability to comply will remain tied
to the Protocol's assistance.'42
One suggestion is to make the Multilateral Fund's financial
assistance contingent on adequate national implementation
legislation that affects all members of the community. Weak state
legislation undermines the enforcement of the Montreal Protocol
because internal regulators leave illegal behavior unchecked. 143
Domestic legislation should be well-defined, feasible to implement,
but above all, its penalties should make the cost of noncompliance
139. See Illegal Trade Study, supra note 137, 117 (noting that the Montreal
Protocol's EAU could resemble that of CITES, which provides technical assistance
to countries, conducts missions to countries experiencing particular difficulties
with implementation, and also coordinates with law enforcement agencies).
140. See U.N. EP, DIVISION OF ENVTL. POL'Y IMPLEMENTATION, GUIDELINES ON
COMPLIANCE WITH AND ENFORCEMENT OF MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL
AGREEMENTS 6 (2001), http://www.unep.org/DEPI/programmes/UNEP-
Guidelines forMEAs-EnglishEdition.doc [hereinafter UNEP Guidelines]
(suggesting that the participation of many domestic stakeholders enables the
country to develop its institutions by increasing its decision-making capabilities
and upgrading other administrative skills).
141. See Drumbl, supra note 86, at 303 (arguing that the Montreal Protocol,
among other MEAs, has a very narrow interpretation of capacity-building, and it
should involve an overhaul of political, economic, and social institutions).
142. See id. at 302 (noting that the disenfranchisement of affected citizens in
formulating environmental policy leaves developing countries dependent on
international agencies to design their own policies).
143. See AKELLA & CANNON, supra note 71, at 22 (noting that weak laws, those
that are ambiguous or have disproportionately low penalties, cause domestic
enforcement agencies to be inadequate).
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greater than compliance. 44 To accomplish this, part of the non-
A5Cs' obligations should be to provide legal advice to the A5Cs in
drafting their own legislation and creating sound national policies.
Further, more financial aid from the Multilateral Fund ought to go
to enhancing the technical skills of existing personnel in local
communities. The Montreal Protocol focuses on increasing technical
capacity of developing states by mandating trade in technology, but
lacks any provisions that require the training of local public-sector
employees.145 The Montreal Protocol should include training
provisions for all members of the enforcement community, from
high-level government officers to low-level personnel, on issues
ranging from detecting illegal ODS use to sharing enforcement
techniques among various agencies.146
With increased capabilities, weak states may have a better chance
of fulfilling their reporting requirements under the Montreal
Protocol. Ultimately, the aim for weak states will be to establish
performance monitoring agencies capable of sophisticated
monitoring of their ODS use.147 Until weak states are able to
maintain these agencies on their own, more financial assistance
should go towards developing these essential monitoring agencies. 14
C. USE ALL OPTIONS UNDER THE NCP
The parties should use all the tools provided in the NCP, and
include trade sanctions as a remedial option to address
noncompliance. The NCP is not an inadequate framework, but the
144. See UNEP Guidelines, supra note 140, at 9.
145. See London Amendments, supra note 4, art. 10, 30 I.L.M. at 550 (requiring
developed states to share technology and information as a means of compliance
assistance on a national level); see also AKELLA & CANNON, supra note 71, at 24
(arguing that budgetary constraints leave personnel undereducated and ill trained to
perform their jobs adequately, which adversely affects the entire enforcement
community).
146. See UNEP Guidelines, supra note 140, at 11.
147. See AKELLA & CANNON, supra note 71, at 26 (noting that a general
enforcement problem with weak states is the lack of performance monitoring
agencies capable of systematic and routine monitoring).
148. See id. (demonstrating that performance monitoring agencies are so crucial
because without the ability to assess their own performance, governments cannot
identify where their overall weaknesses lie).
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problem with it lies in the parties' reluctance to use the
confrontational provisions, such as the withdrawal of rights and
privileges when a party is noncompliant. 149 Because the reluctance of
parties to use formal trade sanctions reveals a concern about this
form of punishment, parties instead could use this withdrawal option
first to see how states react to punitive measures. IS°
Although the parties prefer a facilitative, consensus-driven
approach to the NCP, the behavior of weak states indicates that a
more deterrence-oriented emphasis could be helpful.' For instance,
the parties should amend the provision that permits the
Implementation Committee to conduct information-gathering only
upon the suspected party's invitation. 52 Perhaps if this provision
were to allow the Committee to investigate noncompliance without
invitation from the suspected party, then it would serve as a deterrent
for potentially violating parties that hope to avoid further implication
of the NCP. Along these lines, the Meetings of the Parties should not
be so hesitant to declare a state noncompliant, for this declaration
alone would serve as its own mild type of sanction. 53
CONCLUSION
CDR addresses the reality that not all states are equal in their
abilities to comply with international law, but CDR leaves much to
149. See Sarma, supra note 8, at 305 (reporting that at most, parties have given
warnings of suspending rights under the Protocol).
150. See id. at 308 (noting that the framers wanted universal ratification of the
Protocol and thought punitive measures would discourage signatories).
151. See Peggy Rodgers Kalas & Alexia Herwig, Dispute Resolution Under the
Kyoto Protocol, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53, 80 (2000) (observing that the parties
themselves, rather than a judicial body, handle compliance issues in a way "akin to
a diplomatic negotiation").
152. See Fourth Meeting, supra note 64, annex IV (allowing the Implementation
Committee to conduct deeper investigations when it is suspicious of
noncompliance); see also discussion supra Part II.C (detailing the tools provided
under the formal NCP).
153. See Robin R. Churchill & Geir Ulfstein, Autonomous Institutional
Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed
Phenomenon in International Law, 94 Am. J. INT'L L. 623, 646 (2000) (referring to
the naming of a state in noncompliance as a form of "shaming," a situation most
states would want to avoid publicly).
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be desired with its overly simplistic binary classification of the world
into developed and developing states. The Montreal Protocol
incorporates CDR into its provisions with modem compliance
theories of law that focus on compliance assistance, rather than
punishment. But weak states are a special subset of developing
states, to which the theories that the Montreal Protocol subscribes
may not be applicable. 54
Instances of weak states' noncompliance with the Montreal
Protocol, like the thriving black market and the failure to meet the
basic reporting requirements, indicate that the Protocol's progressive
structure fails weak states. However, by tempering the Montreal
Protocol's approach with both positive and negative enforcement,
designing stronger compliance assistance provisions, and interpreting
the NCP more strictly, the parties to the Montreal Protocol can help
ensure compliance for weak states.
154. See discussion supra Parts I.D, II.A (describing the characteristics of weak
states and explaining that weak state behavior is inimical to the state behavior that
scholars regularly understand).
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